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larity increased, and as a consequence some other portion of the brain must become less vascular. Secondly, a certain amount of pressure must be exerted on the surrounding tissues which will produce a more rapid movement of the blood current. Take attention. In the state of indifference the encephalic circulation will have a certain balance. If an impression is made on some sensory surface of sufficient strength to secure attention, the vascular activity of the part receiving the impression will be increased. So with attention. Its cerebral correlation is the focussing of the encephalic circulation in the direction of the activity, the increased activity of the circulation reacting on the energy of the tissue, thus making the mental effect produced stronger. "The momentum of the circulation is now directed towards "the centres of ideation and voluntary motion, and that implies derivation from "and consequent weakening of functional vigor in the sensory ganglia."

Similar applications are made to explain other familiar phenomena of mental physiology, including hypnotism. His principles, the author states, may also be applied to hysteria and other forms of insanity.

It is not within the province of *The Monist* to pass judgment upon special researches of this character. In the formulation of his problems, and in the clear emphasis of the points at issue, Dr. Cappie's method reminds us of Ribot. Also, with respect to the influence of anatomical characters on physiological and correlatively on psychical action, the idea of the author is related to the remarks of M. Binet, on a different subject, presented in Vol. III, No. 1, and Vol. IV, No. 1, of *The Monist*. But whatever their ultimate worth—which experience, if not experiment, will sometime determine—the reader of Dr. Cappie's work will find his conclusions clearly and undogmatically put, and will not regret the time spent upon its perusal.

THOMAS J. McCORMACK.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION. By *Benjamin Kidd*. New York and London: Macmillan & Co. 1894. Pp. 348. Price, \$2.50.

It is one of the chief results of Mr. Kidd's meditations that the evolution which is slowly proceeding in human society is not primarily intellectual but religious in character. "It would appear," he says, "that when man became a social creature "his progress ceased to be *primarily* in the direction of the development of his intellect. Thenceforward, in the conditions under which natural selection has operated, his interests as an individual were no longer paramount; they became subordinate to the distinct and widely different interests of the longer-lived social organism to which he for the time being belonged. The intellect, of course, continues to be a most important factor in enabling the system to which the individual belongs to maintain its place in the rivalry of life; but it is no longer the prime factor. . . . The race would, in fact, appear to be growing more and more "religious, the winning sections being those in which, *ceteris paribus*, this type of "character is most fully developed."

In speaking of the Utilitarian conception of ethics, which he rejects as incon-

sistent with the teachings of evolutionary science, Mr. Kidd well says that "The 'greatest good which the evolutionary forces, operating in society, are working out, 'is the good of the social organism as a whole. [But that] *the greatest number in this sense is comprised of the members of generations yet unborn or unthought of, to whose interests the existing individuals are absolutely indifferent.*" His own idea of the teaching of evolutionary science as applied to society is "that there is only "one way in which the rationalistic factor in human evolution can be controlled; "namely, through the instrumentality of religious systems. These systems constitute the absolutely characteristic feature of our evolution, the necessary and inevitable complement of our reason. It is under the influence of these systems "that the evolution of the race is proceeding; it is in connexion with these systems "that we must study the laws which regulate the character, growth, and decay of "societies and civilisations."

The author disclaims any pretension to treat the subject of the evolution of society "in its relations to that wider field of philosophical inquiry of which it forms a province." This may, perhaps, explain Mr. Kidd's contention that those who aspire after a rational basis for individual conduct in society are in pursuit of something which can never exist. "There can never be," he says, "such a thing as a "rational religion. The essential element in all religious beliefs must apparently "be the *ultra-rational sanction* which they must provide for social conduct. . . . "No form of belief is capable of functioning as a religion in the evolution of society "which does not provide an *ultra-rational sanction for social conduct in the individual.* In other words: *A rational religion is a scientific impossibility representing "from the nature of the case an inherent contradiction of terms."*

Mr. Kidd holds this view because of his definition of religion which is: "*A religion is a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class "of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter "in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing.*"

If you say to him, "Here is a religion, scientifically deduced, with no supra-rational sanction," he will answer, "That religion is not a religion because it is not 'a social phenomenon. It has not proved itself to be a religion. It has not influenced and moved large masses of men in the manner of a religion. If you wish 'to accept this system as a religion you may, but you do so merely on the *ipse dixit* 'of a small group of persons who chance so to describe it."

In a sense this is true. Not every wild scheme of conduct or view of the world is a religion. To be such, it must be proved. But admitting that the proof must be more than individual, it does not necessarily follow that it must be historical. When Buddha reached his solution of the religious question, was it or was it not a religion? According to Mr. Kidd, it was not; but the fact is, it was. Buddha's proof was deduced from the logic of facts, just as the proofs of the scientific schemes of religion, which Mr. Kidd repudiates, claim to be deduced. Whether the deduction

is correct is another question ; but at any rate it is a subject of reason. Says Buddha ("Mahātanhāsakkhamya Sutta, Majjhima Nikāya," Vol. I. p. 265) : "If ye now know thus, and see thus, O disciples, will ye then say : We respect the Master, and out of reverence for the Master do we thus speak?"—"That we shall not, O sire." — . . . "What ye speak, O disciples, is it not even that which ye have yourselves known, yourselves seen, yourselves realised?"—"It is, sire." Here is a religion without a supra-rational sanction for conduct. And the fact goes to disprove Mr. Kidd's whole theory.*

T. J. McC.

PAIN, PLEASURE, AND ÆSTHETICS. An Essay Concerning the Psychology of Pain and Pleasure, with Special Reference to Æsthetics. By *Henry Rutgers Marshall*, M.A. London and New York : Macmillan & Co. 1894. Pp. 359. Price \$3.00.

The main idea of this book is to treat æsthetics as a branch of hedonics ; art is viewed as a species of pleasure, and artistic enjoyment is defined as that kind of pleasure which is relatively permanent in revival (Chap. III). This classification, simple though it is as stated in its generality, is defended by the author with elaborate circumlocution by investigations into the psychology of the phenomena of pleasure and pain, for which he coins the new word *algedonic*† (derived from *ἄλγος* and *ἡδονή*). The first chapter (pp. 1-62) contains a discussion of feeling, emotion, *Gefühl*, *Empfindung*, *sensibilité* in their relation to algedonic phenomena ; the theory that "pleasure and pain are qualities of a most general nature, either one of which may, and one of which must, belong to each psychic element which is differentiable" (p. 61) being proposed as a working hypothesis. The fourth and fifth chapters discuss the much mooted problem of the physical basis of pleasure and pain. We read on page 169 (repeated on p. 194), "The activity of the organ of any content if efficient is pleasurable, if inefficient is painful." Efficiency or inefficiency are described as "functions of the relation between activity and nutrition, pleasure being dependent upon the use of surplus stored force and pain upon conditions under which the outcome of the organ's activity is less than should be expected in consideration of the energy involved in the stimulus." This view seems to us wholly inadequate to cover the facts to be explained, but the author not only finds some corroboration of it, but also trusts it "to be in line with the important position maintained in Chapter I, namely that pleasure and pain are general qualities" as stated above. In the second chapter the author protests against identifying the emotions with pleasure and pain phenomena (p. 90 and 94-95), calling the former "representative pleasures and pains" and defining them as "the psychic coincidents of relatively fixed co-ordinated

* Mr. Kidd says the notion of *Karman* is the ultra-rational sanction of Buddhism, and with this dismisses this religion as fitting in with his theory. But the kernel of the idea of *Karman* is certainly not ultra-rational, unless the theory of heredity and evolution are so.

† *Alghedonic* (to be pronounced "alg-hē-do'nic," not "al-je-donic") would have been more appropriate.